Spinoza's Ethics
Ethics
FIRST PART
Concerning God
DEFINITIONS
I. By CAUSE OF ITSELF (causa sui) I understand that whose essence involves existence; or, that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.
II. That thing is said to be FINITE IN ITS KIND (in suo genere finita) which can be limited by another thing of the same kind. E.g., a body is said to be finite because we can always conceive another larger than it. Thus a thought is limited by another thought. But a body cannot be limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.
III. By SUBSTANCE (substantia) I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: that is, that, the conception of which does not depend on the conception of another thing, from which conception it must be formed.
IV. By ATTRIBUTE (attributum) I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.
V. By MODES (modus) I understand the Modifications (affectiones) of a substance; or, that which is in something else through which it is also conceived.
VI. By God (Deus) I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
Explanation. - I say absolutely infinite, but not in its kind. For of whatever is infinite only in its kind, we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence of what is absolutely infinite there appertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.
VII. That thing is said to be FREE (libera) which exists by the mere necessity of its own nature and is determined to act by itself alone. That thing is said to be NECESSARY (necessaria), or rather COMPELLED (coacta), which is determined by something else to exist and act in a certain fixed and determinate way.
VIII. I understand ETERNITY (aeternitas) to be existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the mere definition of an eternal thing.
Explanation.- For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth, just as is the essence of a thing, and therefore cannot be explained by duration or time, even though the duration is conceived as wanting beginning and end.
AXIOMS
I. All things which exist, exist either in themselves or in something else.
II. That which cannot be conceived through another thing must be conceived through itself.
III. From a given determinate cause an effect follows of necessity, and on the other hand, if no determinate cause exists, it is impossible that an effect should follow.
IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause, and involves it.
V. Things which have nothing in common reciprocally cannot be comprehended reciprocally through each other, or, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.
VI. A true ideal must agree with that of which it is the idea (ideatum).
VII. The essence of that which can be conceived as not existing does not involve existence.
SECOND PART
Concerning the nature and origin of the mind
PREFACE
I NOW pass on to explain such things as must follow from the essence of God, or, of a being eternal and infinite: not all of them indeed (for infinite things in infinite ways must follow from that essence, as we have shown in Part I., Prop. 16), but only such as can lead us by the hand (so to speak) to the knowledge of the human mind and its consummate blessedness.
DEFINITIONS
I. BY BODY (corpus) I understand a mode which expresses in a certain and determinate manner the essence of God in so far as he is considered as an extended thing (see Part I., Prop. 25)
II. I say that that appertains to the essence of a thing which, when granted, the thing itself is necessarily posited, and which, when negated, the thing is necessarily negated; or that without which the thing, or on the other hand, which without the thing can neither exist nor be conceived.
III. BY IDEA (idea) I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms by reason of its being a thinking thing.
Explanation. - I say conception rather than perception, for the name perception seems to indicate that the mind is passive in relation to the object, while conception seems to express an action of the mind.
IV. BY ADEQUATE IDEA (idea adaequata) I understand an idea which, if it is considered in itself without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic denominations of a true notion. - I say intrinsic in order that I may exclude what is extrinsic, i.e., the agreement between the idea and that of which it is the idea.
V. DURATION (duratio) is indefinite continuation of existing.
Explanation. - I say indefinite because it can in no wise be determined by means of the nature itself of an existing thing nor again by an efficient cause, which necessarily posits the existence of a thing but does not negate it.
VI. REALITY and PERFECTION (realitas et perfectio) I understand to be the same.
VII. BY PARTICULAR THINGS (res singulares) I understand things which are finite and have a determinate existence; but if several of them so concur in one action that they all are at the same time the cause of one effect, I consider them all thus far as one particular thing.
AXIOMS
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, in the order of nature it can equally happen that this or that man exists as that he does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. The modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever notions of the mind are distinguished by name, do not exist unless an idea in the same individual exists of the thing loved, Fired, etc. But an idea can exist although no other mode of thinking exists.
IV. We sense that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We neither sense nor perceive any particular things save bodies and modes of thinking. For Postulates.
THIRD PART
Concerning the origin and nature of the emotions
MOST who have written on the emotions and on the manner of human life, seem to have dealt not with natural things which follow the universal laws of nature, but with things which are outside the sphere of nature: they seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. …Yet excellent men have not been wanting (to whose labour and industry I feel myself much indebted) who have written excellently in great quantity on the right manner of life, and left to men counsels full of wisdom: yet no one has yet determined, as far as I know, the nature and force of the emotions and what the mind can do in opposition to them for their constraint. I know that the most illustrious Descartes, although he also believed that the human mind had absolute power over its actions, endeavoured to explain the human emotions through their first causes, and to show at the same time the way in which the mind could have complete control over the emotions: but, in my opinion, he showed nothing but the greatness and ingenuity of his intellect, as I shall show in its proper place. For I wish to revert to those who prefer rather to abuse and ridicule the emotions and actions of men than to understand them. It will doubtless seem most strange to these that …Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it: for nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting is everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of nature according to which all things are made and changed from one form into another, are everywhere and always the same, and therefore there must be one and the same way of understanding the nature of all things, that is, by means of the universal laws and rules of nature. Therefore such emotions as hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other particular things: and therefore they acknowledge certain causes through which they are understood, and have certain properties equally worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, the contemplation alone of which delights us. And so I shall treat of the nature and force of the emotions, and the power of the mind over them, in the same manner as I treated of God and the mind in the previous parts, and I shall regard human actions and appetites exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies.
DEFINITIONS
I. I call that an ADEQUATE CAUSE (adaequata causa) whose effect can clearly and distinctly be perceived through it. I call that one INADEQUATE or PARTIAL (inadaequata seu partialis) whose effect cannot be perceived through itself alone.
II. I say that we ACT when something takes place within us or outside of us whose adequate cause we are, that is (prev. Def.), when from our nature anything follows in us or outside us which can be clearly and distinctly understood through that nature alone. On the other hand, I say we are PASSIVE (pati) when something takes place in us or follows from our nature of which we are only the partial cause.
III. By EMOTION (affectus) I understand the modifications of the body by which the power of action of the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these modifications.
Explanation. - Thus if we can be the adequate cause of these modifications, then by the emotion I understand an ACTION (actio), if otherwise a PASSION (passio).
FOURTH PART
On human servitude, or the strength of the emotions
PREFACE
HUMAN lack of power in moderating and checking the emotions I call servitude. For a man who is submissive to his emotions does not have power over himself, but is in the hands of fortune to such an extent that he is often constrained, although he may see what is better for him, to follow what is worse. I purpose accordingly in this part to show the cause of this, and what there is good and bad in the emotions. But before I begin I will preface something concerning perfection and imperfection, and then good and bad.
He that determines to do anything, and finishes it, calls it perfect, and not only does he say this, but so does any one else who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the mind of the author of that work and his design. For example, if any one sees some work (which I suppose not yet finished), and knows that the design of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call that house imperfect, and on the contrary, he will call it perfect as soon as he sees it brought to the end which its author determined to give to it. But if any one sees some piece of work the like of which he had never seen, and does not know the mind of the artificer, he clearly will not know whether the work be perfect or not. This seems to have been the first meaning of these words. But afterwards, when men began to form universal ideas and to think out exemplars of houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer certain exemplars to others, it came about that every one called that perfect which he saw to agree with the universal idea which he had formed of that sort of thing, and on the contrary, imperfect what he saw less agree with the exemplar that he had conceived, although in the opinion of the artificer it might be perfect. There seems to be no other reason that men should call natural things which are not made with human hands perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form universal ideas of natural as well as artificial things, which they regard as exemplars to which nature looks for guidance (for they think that nature does nothing without some end in view). When, therefore, they see something to take place in nature which less agrees with the exemplar that they have conceived of that kind of thing, they think that nature has been guilty of error or has gone astray and has left that thing imperfect. We see thus that men have been wont to call things of nature perfect or imperfect from prejudice rather than from a true knowledge, for we showed in the appendix of the first part that nature does not act with an end in view: for that eternal and infinite being we call God or nature acts by the same necessity as that by which it exists, for we showed that it acts from the same necessity of its nature as that by which it exists (see Prop. 16, Part I.).
Therefore the reason or cause why God or nature acts and why it exists is one and the same; therefore, as God exists with no end in view, he does not act with any end in view, but has no principle or purpose either in existing or acting. A cause, then, that is called 'final' is nothing save human appetite itself in so far as it is considered as the principle or primary cause of something. E.g., when we say that
Ethics: Beneduct Spinoza